The vague wording of some provisions, called “constructive ambiguities”, helped to secure acceptance of the agreement and postpone debate on some of the most controversial issues. These include paramilitary dismantling, police reform and the standardisation of Northern Ireland. In a context of political violence during the unrest, the agreement committed participants to “exclusively democratic and peaceful ways to resolve disputes over political issues.” This had two aspects: a referendum was held on both sides of the Irish border (like Brexit, but certainly not Brexit) so that people could decide whether or not they wanted the deal. Northern Ireland has lived with this agreement for 20 years and its name (in any form) is never far from the tip of our politicians` tongues. These institutional arrangements, which have been established in these three areas, are defined in the agreement as “interdependent and interdependent”. In particular, it is found that the functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the North-South Council of Ministers is “so closely linked that the success of the other depends on the success of the other”, and participation in the North-South Council of Ministers is “one of the essential tasks related to the relevant posts in [Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland]”. The main problems that Sunningdale omitted and addressed in the Belfast Agreement are the principle of self-determination, the recognition of both national identities, Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation and legal procedures to make power-sharing compulsory, such as inter-municipal voting and the D`Hondt system for appointing ministers for the executive.   Tommy McKearney, a former IRA member and journalist, argues that the main difference is the British government`s intention to negotiate a comprehensive agreement by involving the IRA and the more intransigent unionists.  With regard to the right to self-determination, the jurist Austen Morgan cites two qualifications. Firstly, the transfer of territories from one State to another must be done through an international agreement between the British and Irish Governments. Secondly, the people of Northern Ireland can no longer bring a united Ireland alone; they need not only the Irish Government, but also the citizens of their neighbouring country, Ireland, to support unity. Morgan also pointed out that, unlike the Ireland Act 1949 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, drawn up under Sunningdale, the 1998 Agreement and the resulting UK legislation explicitly provided for the possibility of a united Ireland.
 The conference takes the form of regular and frequent meetings between British and Irish ministers to promote cooperation between the two governments at all levels. . . .